What is music, what is not?

Plankton · 12-31-2014, 01:02 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rexx Shredd

Not that I want to add to this profound rhetorical ambiguous discussion but I think the difference between what is music and what is not should be intent:

Shouldn't "music" be classified as man-made to differentiate itself? This means that a even if a person goes around with his digital audio-sampler of choice and samples found sounds, then throws them together and - although it may sound like cocaophony - it was purposefully put together, therefore music........conversely, I could walk through the woods and hear the coincidental sounds of several unrelated things that may form a "musical" melody based on the Western twelve-step form of music and - although "musical" to my ears because I am used to the Western paradigm of what constitutes it - it is still a natural anomaly with no purposeful intent and, therefore, not music

Quote:

Originally Posted by Zyrada

My personal definition of music: Sound created and/or perceived as having purpose and some degree of non-utilitarian intent ("non-utilitarian intent" meaning: not created and/or perceived as subservient to another object, function, or activity) within the context of an artistic dialogue (whether or not the music is consciously created and/or perceived as part of any dialogue is irrelevant, since no art exists in a vacuum).

... sometimes I think I should have gone to law school instead of music school.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rexx Shredd

Which is a much more elaborate version of what I said above, isn't it?

*cough*

http://www.musicbanter.com/1497028-post83.html

Quote:

Originally Posted by Plankton from way back in October, but nobody cares. Woes me.

I know it's kind of like cheating, but the OP had me thinking, and I usually go to the wiki to at least get some sort of reference when I can't quite put my finger on my thoughts, and when I found this, it all clicked for me. Mostly the bolded parts.

Quote:

In his 1983 book, Music as Heard, which sets out from the phenomenological position of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricœur, Thomas Clifton defines music as "an ordered arrangement of sounds and silences whose meaning is presentative rather than denotative. . . . This definition distinguishes music, as an end in itself, from compositional technique, and from sounds as purely physical objects." More precisely, "music is the actualization of the possibility of any sound whatever to present to some human being a meaning which he experiences with his body—that is to say, with his mind, his feelings, his senses, his will, and his metabolism" (Clifton 1983, 1). It is therefore "a certain reciprocal relation established between a person, his behavior, and a sounding object" (Clifton 1983, 10).

Clifton accordingly differentiates music from nonmusic on the basis of the human behavior involved, rather than on either the nature of compositional technique or of sounds as purely physical objects. Consequently, the distinction becomes a question of what is meant by musical behavior: "a musically behaving person is one whose very being is absorbed in the significance of the sounds being experienced." However, "It is not altogether accurate to say that this person is listening to the sounds. First, the person is doing more than listening: he is perceiving, interpreting, judging, and feeling. Second, the preposition 'to' puts too much stress on the sounds as such. Thus, the musically behaving person experiences musical significance by means of, or through, the sounds" (Clifton 1983, 2).

In this framework, Clifton finds that there are two things that separate music from nonmusic: (1) musical meaning is presentative, and (2) music and nonmusic are distinguished in the idea of personal involvement. "It is the notion of personal involvement which lends significance to the word ordered in this definition of music" (Clifton 1983, 3–4). This is not to be understood, however, as a sanctification of extreme relativism, since "it is precisely the 'subjective' aspect of experience which lured many writers earlier in this century down the path of sheer opinion-mongering. Later on this trend was reversed by a renewed interest in 'objective,' scientific, or otherwise nonintrospective musical analysis. But we have good reason to believe that a musical experience is not a purely private thing, like seeing pink elephants, and that reporting about such an experience need not be subjective in the sense of it being a mere matter of opinion" (Clifton 1983, 8–9).

Clifton's task, then, is to describe musical experience and the objects of this experience which, together, are called "phenomena," and the activity of describing phenomena is called "phenomenology" (Clifton 1983, 9). It is important to stress that this definition of music says nothing about aesthetic standards.

Music is not a fact or a thing in the world, but a meaning constituted by human beings. . . . To talk about such experience in a meaningful way demands several things. First, we have to be willing to let the composition speak to us, to let it reveal its own order and significance. . . . Second, we have to be willing to question our assumptions about the nature and role of musical materials. . . . Last, and perhaps most important, we have to be ready to admit that describing a meaningful experience is itself meaningful. (Clifton 1983, 5–6)

For me, even a fart can be a musical experience.

But if this horse aint beat up enough for ya, by all means carry on.